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Abstract—Opportunistic networks enable users to communi-
cate in the absence of network infrastructure. But forwarding
messages in such a network incurs costs for nodes in terms of
energy and storage. This may lead to nodes being selfish and
not forwarding messages for other nodes, resulting in degraded
network performance. This paper presents a novel incentive
mechanism for opportunistic networks that uses pre-existing
social-network information to detect and punish selfish nodes,
incentivising them to participate in the network. Trace-driven
simulations demonstrate that our mechanism performs better
than existing mechanisms, and that social-network information
can also be used to improve existing incentive mechanisms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Even with the modern ubiquity of the Internet, there still
exist certain scenarios where current infrastructure networks
may be unable to provide a communication medium. Such
scenarios include areas when infrastructure networks are
unavailable or overloaded, e.g., developing nations, disaster
recovery scenarios, or even at busy concerts or sporting events.
In these scenarios we can leverage the social network of
human encounters to provide a mechanism for exchanging in-
formation: an Opportunistic Network [1]. As people encounter
each other, their wireless devices such as mobile phones can
communicate wirelessly, using every available opportunity,
to forward information from person to person. These oppor-
tunistic networks have been proposed for applications ranging
from messaging, participatory sensing and crowdsourced data-
retrieval, to ubiquitous mobile social networks.
Opportunistic networking relies on cooperation between
nodes, that is, the users participating in the network, to perform
efficiently. Opportunistic routing protocols depend on nodes
forwarding messages for each other, as otherwise the only
delivery mechanism would be for the creator of a message
to encounter the message destination node and deliver the
message directly. Cooperative forwarding, however, incurs a
cost to the forwarding nodes, both in terms of energy (battery
power) and storage (the space required to store forwarded
messages). Both of these are a constrained resource in mobile
devices such as those used in opportunistic networks.
Due to these costs, nodes may wish to avoid the costs
associated with participation in an opportunistic network, by
not forwarding messages for other nodes. Figure 1 shows the
results of an opportunistic network simulation where nodes
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Fig. 1. Simulation of an opportunistic network application using Epidemic
routing [2], and the Reality Mining mobile-phone trace [3]. As the proportion
of selfish nodes in the network increases, network performance in terms of
delivery ratio decreases.
act selfishly: the performance of the network, i.e., the number
of messages delivered, decreases rapidly as the percentage
of selfish nodes increases. If we can detect and discourage
selfish behaviour, it might be possible to achieve the same
performance as if no nodes are selfish, even if all the nodes
have a propensity for selfish behaviour.
But how can we create incentives for nodes to cooperate?
This paper investigates how to use social-network information
to do so. We present an incentive mechanism for oppor-
tunistic networks, IRONMAN (Incentives and Reputation for
Opportunistic Networks using sociAl Networks), that uses
social-network information to bootstrap the detection and
discouragement of selfishness. We demonstrate IRONMAN’s
superior performance over two existing incentive mechanisms,
and show how to improve existing mechanisms by using
social-network information.
The contributions of this paper are to show that:
• existing incentive mechanisms are inappropriate for op-
portunistic networks.
• social-network information can bootstrap a trust mecha-
nism to discourage selfishness in opportunistic networks.
Next, we discuss existing incentive mechanisms. We then
introduce our social-network-based incentive mechanism in
Section III. Section IV describes a set of trace-driven simula-
tions using three real-world traces, two routing protocols and
four different incentive mechanisms. Section V shows that our
protocol performs well across all traces and protocols. Finally
we conclude and discuss future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Incentives, reputation and trust have been extensively stud-
ied in peer-to-peer and mobile ad hoc networks, and more
recently, in sensor and delay-tolerant (DTN) networks. We
draw on work from these other fields to tailor an approach
suitable for opportunistic networks.
To combat selfishness, it must first be detected. Several
approaches use “watchdog” mechanisms [4]–[7], where a third
node oversees a message exchange between two nodes to
verify its authenticity. Such an approach, however, is in-
appropriate for opportunistic networks, as routes are rarely
static and the inter-contact times are large; neighbours are
not consistently available to monitor the behaviour of one
another. The most common detection approach is for all nodes
to monitor all their own encounters, and to exchange opinions
when they interact. Nodes then use these collated opinion data
to make decisions on the trustworthiness of individual nodes.
Many different mechanisms exist to create incentives to
discourage selfishness [8]: from bartering (a direct exchange of
services), to currency (behaviour that benefits other users earns
measurable credits exchangeable for services). In the middle
of this spectrum lies asynchronous bilateral trading: nodes
perform actions to benefit one another, but not necessarily at
the same point in time. Nodes can maintain a concept of credits
using this approach [8], but limits on the number of credits
are frequently needed to prevent credit explosion. Kangasharju
et al. use a similar approach for opportunistic networks [9] .
Wang and Li’s routing protocol for selfish and rational
wireless ad hoc networks assumes nodes compensate each
other for forwarding cost [10]. Their scheme however, assumes
that nodes in the multicast group do not charge each other for
data exchange. Suri and Narahari go further and develop a
scheme BIC-B, in which all nodes may charge one another
for forwarding [11]. BIC-B however, assumes a centralised
payment arbiter can allocate compensation for forwarding
cost based on knowledge of the forwarding paths, making it
inappropriate for use in opportunistic networks.
Yu et al.’s reputation system for peer-to-peer networks has
nodes build opinions of other nodes by analysing the quality
of service (QoS) that they receive from these nodes [12]. A
rating-discovery algorithm maintains consistency of ratings
across the network. Peer-to-peer networks, however, have
different properties to opportunistic networks. Even though
there is potentially high churn in peer-to-peer networks, it is
generally assumed that direct connectivity between any two
nodes in the peer-to-peer network is possible, which is unlikely
to be true in an opportunistic network.
For a disconnected opportunistic network, it is therefore
necessary to rely on the encounters between nodes as the
only way to exchange data and incentive mechanism control
traffic. To verify opinions, we must be able to prove that the
opinion is based on a real experience–how can we prove that
messages were exchanged, or that encounters occurred? One
way to validate encounters is to use encounter tickets [13], a
cryptographic mechanism nodes can use to prove encounters
and message exchanges took place. This allows nodes to build
up a history of message exchanges to use to construct an
opinion of other nodes. Nodes can exchange encounter tickets
and opinions during encounters.
Lu et al. propose an encounter-ticket-based incentive mech-
anism [14], but this requires a trusted authority (an out-of-
band oracle), which makes it inappropriate for opportunistic
networks. Li et al. use a history-based approach [15] which
floods control messages to the network, potentially consuming
lots of nodes’ resources.
RELICS [16] encourages cooperation through ranking.
Nodes estimate the likelihood of message delivery for each
of the nodes they encounter, and use this to rank nodes. A
node’s rank is improved by being on the forwarding path of
successful delivery. Nodes adjust their energy expenditure to
meet a desired delivery ratio threshold (decided a priori). By
expending more energy (forwarding more messages), nodes
can hope to deliver more messages, increasing their rank with
other nodes. Similarly if their delivery ratio is above the
threshold, nodes drop their energy expenditure.
To summarise, none of the existing mechanisms work where
infrastructure connectivity and delivery acknowledgements
cannot be assumed. We now present such a mechanism.
III. AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM FOR OPPORTUNISTIC
NETWORKS
Opportunistic networks exploit the interconnections of in-
dividuals as they go about their daily lives. In society we
form ties and connections with people around us, be it work
colleagues, friends or family. Our goal is to use a record of
these social-network data from self-reported social networks
(SRSNs) to bootstrap an incentive mechanism for opportunis-
tic networks. SRSNs can be obtained through interview, or
from an online social network (e.g., Facebook friends lists).
By viewing those members of the opportunistic network
that are also in a node’s SRSN as more trustworthy, we can
exploit the implicit trust relationships provided by the users.
Detecting selfish behaviour quickly is important, as it reduces
the amount of transmissions to (and due to) selfish nodes, and
therefore the energy wasted. We must balance this, however,
against being too cautious and presuming all nodes are selfish.
Most existing mechanisms are not bootstrapped to work from
network start-up; we use SRSNs to provide reputation for
nodes. We assume that individuals have implicit trust with
members of their SRSN: therefore, when the network starts
up, nodes assign higher trust values to nodes in their SRSN.
A. Detecting selfishness
We now present our IRONMAN mechanism. Consider the
following scenario (Figure 2): Alice wishes to send a package
to Bob. She first meets Eve, however, and gives Eve the
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Fig. 2. Nodes keep history of their encounters and message exchanges. When
nodes meet these histories are exchanged to detect selfishness.
package, believing Eve will meet Bob before Alice does. Eve
then meets Bob, and because Eve is selfish, does not give
Bob the package. Yet later, Alice meets Bob, and they discuss
their encounters. Alice mentions to Bob that she gave Eve a
package for Bob. Bob knows he met Eve, and therefore knows
Eve was being selfish by withholding the package. We extend
this analogy to opportunistic networks.
If nodes can store a history of encounter times and messages
exchanged, and exchange histories during encounters, we can
detect selfishness and altruism as seen in Algorithm 1. If a
node detects another as selfish, the detecting node decrements
its rating for the selfish node by the behaviour constant x.
Similarly, when nodes pass on a message for which they are
not the source: the receiver marks them as altruistic, and their
rating of the node receiving the message is incremented by x.
Additive increase and decrease are used to reduce the effect of
false positives, which can arise when a node pushes a message
out of its buffers due to congestion (giving the appearance that
it deliberately dropped the message).
Algorithm 1 IRONMAN Selfishness detection
1: x←behaviour constant
function EncounterNode(B):
1: history tuples ← [(exchange time, msg id, msg source,
node seen)]
2: exchange forwarding history with B
3: for all message exchanges in foreign history do
4: if exchange time> last encounter with B then
5: if msg destination== my id then
6: if last encounter with node seen > last encounter with B
then
7: if node seen did not give us msg id then
8: Ratingnode seen ←Ratingnode seen− x
function ReceiveMessage(other node, msg src):
1: if other node 6= msg src then
2: Ratingother node ←Ratingother node+ x
Nodes store local ratings of encountered nodes, and ex-
change these during encounters. An encountered node’s trust
score is the sum of the local rating and foreign ratings. Upon
receiving a message the node checks if the source of the
message is the node forwarding. If so, and if the trust score
is not greater than the trust threshold, then the receiving node
will discard the message and notify the forwarding node that
it has been detected as selfish.
Nodes do not accept messages for which they believe the
source of the message to be selfish. To allow nodes that
have been deemed as selfish to improve their trust score,
nodes do pass messages to selfish nodes, allowing them to
forward these messages and therefore improve their ratings.
This approach does not punish nodes that are rarely given
messages to forward, it only punishes those that could have
given a message to a destination but did not. To prove that
encounters took place we assume the presence of encounter
tickets [13]. Nodes use this cryptographic mechanism to prove
that they exchanged messages, by obtaining a signed receipt
of message exchange.
While nodes do not need synchronised clocks, which can
be difficult in an opportunistic network, they must agree on
the relative ordering of encounters. When nodes encounter
one another they exchange the time they believe the current
encounter is taking place at; nodes can thus determine the time
when the encounters in the foreign history took place relative
to their own opinion of the correct time. Nodes can then use
this information despite potential differences in the perceived
time on the nodes. A similar mechanism to IRONMAN could
be used at the clock synchronisation layer to detect lying about
clock times. We leave this, however, to future work.
IV. EVALUATION
We evaluate IRONMAN’s performance through trace-driven
simulation of a simple message-passing application. As the
performance of an opportunistic network may vary depending
on the connectivity patterns of the nodes, we use three real-
world traces in our analysis:
1) Our “SASSY” connectivity trace, available in the
CRAWDAD data archive [17]. 24 individuals carried T-
mote sensor nodes for 3 months [18]. We use the motes’
ZigBee radios to detect co-location and collected the
participants’ Facebook “friends” as SRSNs.
2) The MIT Reality Mining (RM) trace [3]. 99 individuals
carried mobile phones using Bluetooth to detect co-
location. We use users’ phone contact lists as SRSNs.
3) The HOPE dataset [19] of the movements of RFID tags
carried by 767 attendees at the Hackers On Planet Earth
conference. Participants registered their interest in topics
and specific sessions before attending the conference,
which we use as an SRSN, and derive encounters from
the RFID readings. As the dataset is dense, and as most
of the timetable is taken up by hour-long talks, we merge
all contacts between pairs of nodes within one hour.
We believe that these traces capture a wide variety of
possible network scenarios. To avoid the effects of warm-up or
cool-down, where the recent/impending start/end of the trace
may affect node behaviour, we divide the traces into segments
and use the most central segment. As the SASSY trace lasts
over two months we split it into two 30-day segments and a 20
day segment and use the second segment. The nine-month RM
trace is divided into three 30-day periods, from the beginning,
middle and end of the trace respectively, and we use the middle
segment. For the HOPE trace we use the second day of three.
Table I shows the different properties of the overall traces
and the SRSNs. For the RM and HOPE traces the number of
edges, clustering coefficient and graph density are higher in
the encounter data than in the SRSN data. In other words, there
are longer paths in the SRSN data, which might make them
useful for building a trust mechanism. Nodes who are further
away in the SRSN network might be less trusted, despite their
frequent proximity in the trace network, reflecting the idea of
familiar strangers [20]: nodes who you encounter frequently
yet you do not know well.
A. Routing protocols
We analyse IRONMAN running over two different routing
protocols:
1) Epidemic [2]: Nodes forward messages to any encoun-
tered nodes that do not already have a copy.
2) Spray-and-Wait [21]: Messages have a finite number of
copies. Nodes give 50% of their copies of a message
to an encountered if it does not already have a copy.
Once nodes have only one copy left they only give
the message to the destination. We treat the number of
message copies as the number of nodes in the network,
following [22].
We simulate performance at five different levels of selfish-
ness following [23]: 0%, 50%, and 100%. Given Xu et al.’s
finding [24] that the altruism of high-degree nodes is most
important for mitigating the impact of selfishness, we choose
the highest degree nodes to be selfish, so as to maximise the
impact on our simulations.
B. Incentive mechanisms
We compare IRONMAN against two existing incentive
mechanisms, and modifications of these two mechanisms to
use SRSN information:
• IRONMAN: the mechanism outlined in Section III. We
use a value of 100 as the default local rating for SRSN
nodes, 50 for unknown nodes and 50 for the trust thresh-
old. We use 50 as the behavioural constant.
• YSS: the peer-to-peer reputation mechanism developed
by Yu, Singh and Sycara [12]. For the QoS parameter
required to measure nodes’ behaviour, we use the propor-
tion of messages exchanged altruistically, detected using
the same approach described in Section III-A. Where
possible we used the thresholds outlined in their paper:
the default opinion of nodes that are not known is 0.5,
which is the same value as the trust threshold. We use
their exponential approach to weighting opinions and
credibility of opinions.
• RELICS+S: A modified version of RELICS [16], as
representative of the state-of-the-art in incentive mech-
anisms for opportunistic networks. We attempt to use
parameters as described in their paper: 0.8 for the desired
delivery ratio threshold, 0.373mAh as the initial energy
level, one hour as the energy epoch, and 14.30mAh
for the increase in energy allowed during each epoch.
Nodes are given a starting rank of two, allowing them
to send two messages before being required to forward
on behalf of other nodes. Estimated delivery probabilities
are 1.0 if a node is the source of a message, and 0.5
otherwise. As RELICS, unlike the other mechanisms,
uses delivery receipts, we simulate these, but assume
that receipts have no forwarding cost, to maximise the
potential performance of RELICS. As RELICS does not
actively detect selfishness, we modified the mechanism to
treat nodes whose rating is below the initial value of two
as selfish, we call this RELICS+S.
• YSS+SRSN: Here we bootstrap the mechanism so that
nodes give members of their social network an opinion
of 1.0 (complete trust). We leave the default trust level for
other nodes as 0.5 and we change the trust mechanism so
that nodes only take into account the opinions of members
of their social network.
• As a control, we also consider performance when no
incentive mechanism is in place.
When a node is detected as selfish it ceases to behave
selfishly. The node may continue to be punished, however,
as other nodes need to detect its altruistic behaviour before
trusting it again.
C. Scenarios and metrics
We perform simulations under two different scenarios, to
highlight different features of the mechanisms:
1) a scenario with no resource constraints: nodes have
infinite buffer space and energy and messages have an
infinite time-to-live (TTL) value. There will be no false
positives of selfishness generated in this scenario, as
nodes will not drop messages due to full buffers.
2) finite buffers, energy and TTL, as listed in Table II.
We simulate ten runs per scenario, per incentive mecha-
nism, per trace. We calculate the delivery ratio (number of
messages delivered over messages sent) to see the difference
in performance across incentive mechanisms.
15% of each trace is used as a warm-up period, where
no messages are created or sent, but nodes may build up
reputation information. All message senders and destinations
are picked from an exponential distribution. For the SASSY
and RM traces, we exponentially distribute the message cre-
ation times throughout the day. As the HOPE trace only lasts
one day, we uniformly distribute the message creation times
throughout the day, to prevent messages from being created
with no time left in the trace for them to be sent.
As nodes in a real deployment would have memory limits,
we restrict the size of the history of recent encounters for
TABLE I
DATASET GRAPH STATISTICS
SASSY RM HOPE
Property SRSN Trace SRSN Trace SRSN Trace
Number of Vertices 25 25 97 87 414 410
Number of Edges 127 107 107 1186 67836 80183
Clustering Coefficient 0.748 0.555 0.255 0.618 0.834 0.976
Graph Density 0.406 0.342 0.023 0.313 0.792 0.954
IRONMAN and both YSS mechanisms to the most recent 1000
entries, in all scenarios.
To study the performance of the incentive mechanisms we
consider the negative impact of selfishness on the network,
using the following metrics:
1) Detection Time. The time that it takes a mechanism
to correctly detect selfish behaviour in a node. This is
the average time between a node choosing to behave
selfishly, and the time that a node is detected as selfish.
A mechanism with a low detection time will minimise
the impact selfish behaviour has on the network.
2) Detection Accuracy. The proportion of selfish nodes that
were correctly detected as selfish by a mechanism. An
ideal mechanism will have a low Detection Time and
high Detection Accuracy.
3) Selfishness Cost. The proportion of forwarded messages
(medium accesses) that were generated as a result of a
node creating a message while it was selfish. In some
respects this can be seen as the “goodput” of a network
with selfish nodes; a mechanism with a low Selfishness
Cost is effectively maximising the use of the network
by cooperative nodes.
We do not consider measuring the reputation changes as a
performance metric as in [12], as measuring impact of the
incentive mechanism on the performance of the network is
sufficient to demonstrate the merit of the mechanism.
TABLE II
SIMULATION ROUTING PARAMETERS
Parameter Value (SASSY/RM/HOPE)
TTL of messages 10 days / 2 days / 2 hours
Message frequency 1 per node per day
Simulation length 30 days / 30 days / 1 day
Message size (MB) 1
Buffer size (MB) 2000
Loss per second (mAh) 1.9×10−6
Time to send bundle (s) 34
Max energy (mAh) 1200
Energy per send (mAh) 0.4
Charge time (h) 8
V. RESULTS
We now examine the performance of the incentive mecha-
nisms in our simulations.
A. Infinite buffer, energy and TTL scenario
Figures 3(a)–3(c) show network performance (in terms of
delivery ratio) across the three traces. It can be seen that
IRONMAN performs the best of the evaluated mechanisms.
All the mechanisms have quite high detection times, due
to intermediate nodes infrequently encountering destination
nodes, but IRONMAN has a higher detection accuracy and
lower detection time than all the other mechanisms in the
SASSY and RM traces (Figures 4(a) and 4(b)). In the much
denser HOPE trace, even though the detection accuracy is
lower than the YSS-based mechanisms (Figure 4(c)), the
resulting delivery ratio (Figure 3(c)) is higher because both
YSS-based mechanisms discard more messages from selfish
nodes. Indeed, in this trace (Figure 3(c)), IRONMAN is not
only the sole mechanism that performs better than having no
detection mechanism at all, but it performs almost as well with
100% of nodes acting selfish as 0%.
In addition to the fastest and most accurate detection of
selfishness, IRONMAN has a lower or equivalent selfishness
cost than the other mechanisms (Figures 5(a)–5(c)). In other
words, IRONMAN is successful at ensuring that the network
is predominantly used by cooperating nodes.
When the YSS mechanism is modified to use social network
information, it performs the same, or better, than the original
mechanism (Figures 3(a)–3(c)). Figures 4(a)–4(c) show that
while YSS+SRSN has a slower detection time than YSS in
two of the traces, it has a higher delivery ratio, as it does not
drop as many messages from nodes perceived as selfish.
Note that to save space, we have omitted the results for
Spray-and-Wait routing, but the relative performance of the
mechanisms is the same as when using epidemic routing.
B. Resource-constrained scenario
As one might expect, when we consider the effects of
energy, buffer and TTL, we see that network performance
drops. In the RM and HOPE traces (Figures 6(b)–6(c)),
IRONMAN has the highest delivery ratios, while in the
SASSY trace (Figure 6(a)), all mechanisms perform similarly.
IRONMAN, however, detects a larger proportion of selfish
nodes (Figure 7(a)), has a lower detection time and a lower
selfishness cost (Figure 8(a)).
The relative detection time is not consistent across the
traces, however. YSS and YSS+SRSN have a lower detec-
tion time and higher detection accuracy in the HOPE trace
(Figure 7(c)) than IRONMAN; the density of the HOPE trace
means the low detection time of YSS and YSS+SRSN (a result
of the exponential weightings of ratings/opinions) causes both
mechanisms to detect a higher proportion of nodes than both
IRONMAN and RELICS+S, and results in a lower detection
time. As in the infinite scenario, however, IRONMAN still has
a higher delivery ratio (Figure 6(c)), despite the lower accuracy
and detection time.
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(a) All the mechanisms perform similarly. IRON-
MAN and RELICS+S are the best performing
when 100% of the nodes are selfish; however,
IRONMAN has less variance.
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(b) All the mechanisms perform similarly, with
YSS performing slightly better than the others at
high levels of selfishness.
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(c) IRONMAN performs equivalent to having no
selfish nodes in the network. Other mechanisms
detect selfishness but do not allow enough for-
warding: YSS and YSS+SRSN drop messages
from nodes they detect as selfish, and RELICS+S’s
energy monitor allows too little forwarding.
Fig. 3. Incentive mechanism performance in the three traces under epidemic routing, with infinite buffer, energy and TTL.
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(a) IRONMAN performs the best, with the highest
accuracy in the lowest time.
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(b) IRONMAN again performs best. YSS per-
forms better than YSS+SRSN as it does not trust
as many nodes implicitly.
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(c) YSS+SRSN and YSS perform best, with low
detection time and high accuracy. In spite of this,
IRONMAN still has the highest delivery ratio
(Figure 6(c)).
Fig. 4. Detection Accuracy against detection time, when 100% of nodes are selfish. Infinite buffer, energy and TTL.
In the HOPE trace, the delivery ratios of YSS and
YSS+SRSN do not change as selfishness in the network
increases, as these mechanisms are able to detect selfishness
and drop messages from those selfish nodes, thereby reducing
the overall performance of the network. YSS and YSS+SRSN
have similar Selfishness Cost results to IRONMAN however,
as YSS and YSS+SRSN do not allow nodes that have become
altruistic to forward many messages. If a group of nodes all
believe each other are selfish, they will drop the messages
created by the other nodes in the group. As the only way to
build up a good reputation is to forward messages for other
nodes, if nodes drop all incoming messages they can not build
up enough reputation to have their own messages forwarded.
The delivery ratio therefore remains low, and the Selfishness
Cost remains high, as is the case for YSS and YSS+SRSN in
the HOPE trace.
Again we see that RELICS+S does not perform as well as
IRONMAN, with a lower delivery ratio (Figures 6(a)–6(c)).
This is because the energy monitor does not allow for nodes
to forward sufficient messages. RELICS+S has a low detection
accuracy in all traces (Figures 7(a)–7(c)), and a high detection
time in all but the SASSY trace. This is because RELICS+S
does not detect selfishness well enough, a problem exacerbated
by the reduced forwarding opportunities. Figures 8(a)–8(c)
show that IRONMAN has the lowest selfishness cost in all
traces; IRONMAN is again the best at reducing the overall
impact of selfish nodes on the network.
Overall we see that IRONMAN can perform as well as
having no selfishness in the network, and SRSN-based mecha-
nisms are always the best (or equivalent to) the best performing
mechanism in the network. The exception is RELICS+S,
which continues to perform badly, because the time to adjust to
the correct energy level causes nodes to miss out on forwarding
opportunities.
Note that again for Spray-and-Wait, the relative performance
of the mechanisms is the same as for epidemic routing.
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(a) IRONMAN performs best, as its low detection
time ensures that more nodes are incentivised away
from selfishness before sending messages.
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(b) IRONMAN performs very well, ensuring al-
most all medium accesses are from altruistic
nodes.
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(c) All mechanisms perform similarly apart from
when all nodes in the network are selfish. The en-
ergy model in RELICS penalises altruistic nodes.
Fig. 5. Selfishness Cost under epidemic routing and infinite buffer, energy and message TTLs.
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(a) All mechanisms perform similarly, with IRON-
MAN performing slightly better at 100% selfish-
ness.
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(b) IRONMAN performs far better than the other
mechanisms, performing as well as having no
selfish nodes in the network.
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(c) The level of selfishness does not affect normal
delivery, however almost all the mechanisms apart
from IRONMAN do not perform well at 100%
selfishness.
Fig. 6. Incentive mechanism performance under epidemic routing, with finite buffer, energy and TTL.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have introduced IRONMAN, an incentive mecha-
nism for opportunistic networks that uses pre-existing social-
network information to bootstrap trust relationships. Unlike
existing mechanisms, IRONMAN does not require an oracle
or infrastructure network, nor delivery receipts. We have
demonstrated that IRONMAN outperforms existing incentive
mechanisms, with accurate detection of selfish nodes in a
timely manner, and improved delivery performance in the
presence of selfishness. As a result, IRONMAN is able to max-
imise the proportion of the network that is used by cooperating
nodes. We have also shown that social-network information
can be used to improve existing incentive mechanisms in a
similar manner. We believe that this use of social-network
information will prove a fruitful topic for researchers in this
and similar areas. For instance, is it possible to use social-
network information to improve incentive mechanisms for
peer-to-peer or ad hoc networks?
In future work we intend to explore the interaction between
the application-layer social-network information that we ex-
ploit for our incentive mechanism, and the use of this infor-
mation in the application itself. Many opportunistic network
applications might themselves involve social networks, for
instance, mobile social networks, crowdsourcing, or participa-
tory sensing. Might it be useful to expose trust relationships
from the routing layer to the application layer, or vice versa?
Or could application-layer detection of misbehaving nodes,
such as anomalous crowdsourced data, be used to inform
routing decisions? Such further study will require both routing
protocol development and application deployment.
We intend to analyse the theoretical reason behind IRON-
MAN’s performance. We also wish to refine our models of
social network behaviour. We currently assume that members
of the same social network will be more likely to trust each
other. But if behaviour is contagious across a social network,
as proposed by Fowler and Christakis [25], then perhaps selfish
behaviour might also propagate, leading to new incentive
challenges.
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